HIV Breakthroughs and Risk Sexual Behavior by Dana Goldman et al.
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES










We are grateful to Jean-Jacques Laffont, Will Manning, Vazha Nadareishvili, and participants in the 2004
Annual Health Economics Conference at the University of Alabama-Birmingham, for helpful comments and
discussion. Abby Alpert provided exceptional research assistance.  The views expressed herein are those of
the author(s) and not necessarily those of the National Bureau of Economic Research.
©2004 by Dana Goldman, Darius Lakdawalla, and Neeraj Sood. All rights reserved. Short sections of text,
not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including
© notice, is given to the source. HIV Breakthroughs and Risky Sexual Behavior
Dana Goldman, Darius Lakdawalla, and Neeraj Sood
NBER Working Paper No. 10516
May 2004, Revised November 2005
JEL No. I1
ABSTRACT
Recent breakthroughs in the treatment of HIV have coincided with an increase in infection rates and
an eventual slowing of reductions in HIV mortality. These trends may be causally related, if
treatment improves the health and functional status of HIV+ individuals and allows them to engage
in more sexual risk-taking. We examine this hypothesis empirically using access to health insurance
as an instrument for treatment status. We find that treatment results in more sexual risk-taking by
HIV+ adults, and possibly more of other risky behaviors like drug abuse. This relationship implies
that breakthroughs in treating an incurable disease like HIV can increase precautionary behavior by
the uninfected and thus reduce welfare. We also show that, in the presence of this effect, treatment
and prevention are social complements for incurable diseases, even though they are substitutes for
curable ones. Finally, there is less under-provision of treatment for an incurable disease than a
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sood@rand.orgI Introduction
Over the past decade, HIV in developed countries has been transformed from a death sentence
into a chronic, manageable disease. Since 1995, the overall US AIDS death rate has fallen
by almost 70 percent. This remarkable turnaround was driven in large part by breakthrough
drugs. Perhaps most important was the introduction of highly active antiretroviral therapy
(HAART), the currently recommended treatment regimen for HIV [Carpenter et al., 2000].
However, Figure I demonstrates that progress against HIV and AIDS has stalled in the
US. AIDS death rates reached a plateau in 1998, at around 5 deaths per 100,000. Even more
troubling has been the rise in the HIV infection rate, which climbed by over forty percent from
1998 to 2001.1 Moreover, the increased rate of infection has occurred over a period during
which sexually active Americans have become more vigilant about safe sex, rather than more
complacent.2 Are these trends in HIV infection and treatment breakthroughs linked? And
how have infection rates risen in spite of increasing precaution in the population at large?
This paper posits that increases in HIV infection rates might themselves have resulted
from improvements in HIV treatment and the accompanying declines in the deadliness of
HIV. In particular, we argue that advances in treatment have improved the health of the
infected, reinvigorated their sexual activity, and thus rekindled the spread of HIV.3 While
risky behavior and sexual promiscuity among the relatively small number of HIV+ people
will not show up in nationwide prevention statistics, it is of ﬁrst-order importance for HIV
1The increased infection rate is almost certainly not due to better diagnosis, as the rate of HIV testing
was stable over this period (based on the General Social Surveys, 1998-2002). Similar growth in incidence
after the diﬀusion of HAART treatment has been observed for gay men in San Francisco [Katz et al., 2002],
heterosexuals in France [Gremy and Beltzer, 2004], and gay men in Amsterdam [Dukers et al., 2002].
2From 1998 to 2002, the rate of condom usage among unmarried Americans rose consistently, and by
17% over the entire period; this is statistically diﬀerent from zero. These statistics are compiled from the
1998 to 2002 General Social Surveys, which asked respondents if they used a condom the last time they had
sex. The sample is unmarried adults who had sex within the last year. Similar trends of ﬂat or increasing
precaution are apparent along various complementary dimensions, such as the number of diﬀerent partners,
frequency of casual sex, sex outside a committed relationship, and sex with a prostitute. (These results are
based on the authors’ calculations using the General Social Surveys, which are described later.)














































































HIV Infection Rate AIDS Death Rate
Figure I
HIV Incidence and Deaths from AIDS in the US.
Note: Data are from CDC HIV/AIDS Surveillance Report 1993-2001 (Year-end editions),
and CDC HIV Mortality L285 Slide Series 2000. Also see Centers for Disease Control [1998].
Data on HIV infection rates are from the 26 states that collected conﬁdential data on HIV
infection rates throughout this period. The death rate, on the other hand, is based on
nationwide numbers.
2incidence, because the HIV+ represent society’s vectors of infection.
Clinical trials and observational studies conclusively demonstrate that HAART lowers
mortality and improves the physical health of HIV+ persons [Hammer et al., 1997; Staszewski
et al., 1999; Jordan et al., 2002; Detels et al., 1998; Palella et al., 1998; Lucas et al., 1999;
Vittinghoﬀ et al., 1999; Lucas et al., 2003; Duggan and Evans, 2005]. We argue that these
considerable health beneﬁts of HAART have led HIV+ people to increase their sexual ac-
tivity and spread the disease. Sexual activity by the HIV+ carries a signiﬁcant risk of
transmission, because many display a clear preference for HIV-negative sex partners: 45% of
HIV+ individuals actively seek HIV-negative sexual partners at least some of the time, and
20% seek HIV-negative partners all the time.4 This may be due in part to a general taste
for healthy, high-quality partners, and possibly also to the unique incentive of individuals
with impaired immune systems to seek out “clean” partners.
The epidemiological literature has downplayed the causal link between treatment and
sexual activity, because simple correlations—both in our data and elsewhere—often ﬁnd
that treatment and sexual activity are unrelated or negatively related [Crepaz et al., 2004;
Moatti et al., 2003]. However, these correlational analyses suﬀer from the problem that
patients on HAART are intrinsically much sicker than other patients. This diﬀerence in
health status masks the causal eﬀect of treatment on sexual behavior, because the poor
health of the treated population leads to diminished sexual activity.
To overcome this problem, we exploit state-level variation in the availability of public
insurance for HIV-suﬀerers. Since treatment with HAART is expensive—costing on average
about $13,000 per year—people with insurance are more likely to get HAART. We ﬁnd that
HIV-suﬀerers who get treatment because they live in states with more generous Medicaid el-
igibility rules are more likely to engage in sexually risky or promiscuous behavior. According
to these estimates, plausibly exogenous treatment with HAART causes an HIV+ individual
4These ﬁgures are based on the authors’ calculations from the HIV Cost and Services Utilization Study
(HCSUS), which is described in Section III.
3to have sex with more than twice as many partners in a given 6-month period. A simple
theoretical model suggests that these eﬀects of HAART are likely to have increased the risk
of infection for the uninfected by 44% or even as much as 100%.
This positive relationship between treatment and risky behavior has several important
implications for welfare and behavior. Since HIV is an incurable infectious disease, improve-
ments in HIV treatment may not have unambiguous beneﬁts for the uninfected. While the
cost of being infected falls, the risk of infection rises with the stock of HIV+ people, who
now live longer and more sexually active lives. Breakthroughs can reduce welfare among
the uninfected if the cost of higher infection risk more than oﬀsets the welfare gain from the
reduced cost of infection. Calibrations of our theoretical model suggests that welfare losses
may indeed have occurred among uninfected Americans.
An appropriate policy response to these adverse welfare eﬀects may be an increase in
public subsidies for HIV-prevention. Treatment breakthroughs can raise the returns to HIV-
prevention by increasing the external costs of risky behavior. This occurs because: ﬁrst,
the increased disease prevalence means that risky behavior is more likely to result in an
infection; and second, each new infection is likely to result in more secondary infections due
to the increased longevity of the infected. Given these eﬀects, we explore the conditions
under which treatment breakthroughs call for greater prevention subsidies.
We begin by laying out the positive implications of HIV treatment breakthroughs for
behavior and the prevalence of HIV. Next, we estimate the eﬀect of treatment on sexual
activity among the HIV+ and use these estimates to quantify the impact of new treatments
on infection risk in Section VI. Finally, in Section VII, we quantify the likely impact on the
welfare of the uninfected and then discuss whether public prevention spending can be used
to mitigate welfare losses for the uninfected.
4II The Positive Implications of HIV Breakthroughs
Treating HIV expands the pool of survivors able to spread the infection, and strengthens
their physical ability to engage in transmissive behavior. The theoretically predicted result
is an increase in the prevalence of the disease. In response, the precautionary behavior of the
uninfected may rise or fall depending on two oﬀsetting eﬀects: the decline in the costliness
of the newly treatable disease, versus the increased risk of exposure.5
Consider a population of sexually active individuals, with the HIV prevalence π. All
individuals value risky sexual activity. For simplicity, suppose that HIV+ people engage in
as much risky behavior r+ as their (exogenous) health allows and receive the corresponding
level of per-period utility w(r+). With probability 1−s, they die or become too sick for sex.6
The lifetime utility of a sexually active infected individual is
w(r+)
1−sβ , where β is the one-period
discount factor.
Uninfected individuals derive concave, increasing utility u(r) from their risky behavior
r. The probability of infection φ rises in a person’s own risky behavior r, the prevalence of
HIV π, and the risky behavior of the HIV+ r+: φ(r;r+,π). If r∗ represents the equilibrium
level of risky behavior among the uninfected and π0 is next period’s prevalence, the lifetime















πs + (1 − π)φ(r∗;r+,π)
πs + (1 − π)
(2)
5The economic theory of AIDS prevention and transmission was pioneered by Philipson and Posner [1993];
Over et al. [2004] explores the speciﬁc relationships between the new treatments, prevention investments,
and risk-taking.
6For our purposes, it is not important to distinguish between these two outcomes, because death and
illness are absorbing, zero-utility states.
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π(1 − s) − φ(r;r
+,π) = 0 (4)
Each equation deﬁnes a relationship between r and π, indexed by the two correlates of HIV+
health, s and r+.
Figure II demonstrates the intuition behind the steady-state dynamics that result from
the pair of equations above. Equation 3 deﬁnes the “Optimal Risk” curve, which character-
izes the behavioral relationship between prevalence and risk-taking: uninfected individuals
8The unique steady-state exists under assumptions best-suited to low-prevalence developed countries,
as discussed in Appendix V. Kremer [1996] analyzes the more general possibility of multiple steady-states,
which are particularly important when people become “fatalistic” about the risk of the disease, so that
increased prevalence primarily raises the cost of staying healthy. In the US, where prevalence is relatively
low, increased risk appears to lower risk-taking [cf, Ahituv et al., 1996], at least for the average person.
6are more cautious when faced with higher disease prevalence. Breakthroughs in treatment
shift this curve up by improving the welfare of the HIV+ (i.e., raising (r+,s)), which makes
the uninfected more willing to risk infection at a given level of exposure risk. On the other
hand, the “Steady-State Risk” curve, deﬁned by Equation 4, characterizes the steady-state
or epidemiological relationship between risk-taking and prevalence: more risk-taking results
in higher prevalence. Breakthroughs shift this curve down, because a given level of prevalence
can be supported by less risk-taking on the part of the uninfected. In other words, increases
in survival and sexual activity among the HIV+ multiply the eﬀects of risky behavior among
the uninfected, so that less of it is needed to sustain the disease at a given level.
The shifts in these two curves both combine to increase prevalence:9 there are more
sexually active HIV+ people who can spread infection; this is reinforced, because the unin-
fected take more risk at any given level of prevalence. However, the eﬀects on precaution are
oﬀsetting and ambiguous: the lower cost of infection encourages risk-taking, while higher
prevalence discourages it.
This reasoning explains why precaution may have risen, as suggested by Figure I, in
spite of the falling cost of HIV-infection. It also illustrates the way in which new treatments
can increase risk for the uninfected, and reveals the importance of quantifying the impact
of treatment breakthroughs on φ(·;r+,π), the risk schedule faced by the uninfected. In
our empirical analysis, we recover the impact of treatment on r+ and combine this with the
known clinical eﬀects of treatment on survival (s), to arrive at estimated increases in the risk
faced by the uninfected. The increased risk is then used in conjunction with the theoretical
model to assess whether or not the welfare of the uninfected declined in the US.
9In the most general models of rational epidemics, the change in long-run prevalence may be ambiguous.
In Appendix V, we provide support for the regularity conditions that lead to this unambiguous result, and
we explain why they are appropriate for the recent history of HIV in the US.
7III Data
We use data from a nationally representative study of HIV+ patients in care—the HIV
Costs and Services Utilization Study (HCSUS). The HCSUS employed a multi-stage national
probability sample design to identify HIV+ patients over 18 years old, who made at least
one visit for regular care in the contiguous United States in January or February of 1996. It
does not include HIV+ patients whose only contact with the health care system was through
military, prison, or emergency department facilities, or who have not made contact with the
health care system for their HIV. HCSUS collected data between March 1996 and January
1998 — a period when HAART entered clinical practice and disseminated widely. HCSUS is
a panel data set with three waves of interviews, which we refer to as “Baseline,” “Follow-Up
1,” and “Follow-Up 2.” Questions about sexual activity were posed to a random sample of
1,794 respondents in Follow-Up 2. 1,421 of these respondents completed the interview (a
completion rate of 79%, or 84% after adjusting for mortality).10 We use this subsample of
HCSUS respondents for our analysis of sexual behavior.11
As our outcome measure, we study the number of sex partners an individual reports over
the past 6-month period. The key explanatory variable of interest is treatment with HAART.
This is derived from HCSUS questions about medications taken by each respondent. HAART
is deﬁned (both clinically, and by the survey) as a combination drug therapy involving three
types of drugs: nucleoside reverse transcriptase inhibitors, protease inhibitors, and non-
nucleoside reverse transcriptase inhibitors. All HAART regimens require at least three drugs,
and the vast majority involve at least one protease inhibitor. A respondent is classiﬁed by
HCSUS as being on HAART if he/she reports taking any of the recognized HAART drug
combinations. Table I presents descriptive statistics for all model variables.
10This sample is representative of the 197,063 HIV+ US adults who received care in 1996 and survived
until 1998.
11Of the 1,421 respondents, 1396 answered the question about “number of sex partners in the last 6
months.”
8Table I






Age (years) 39 39 39
Non-white (%) 65 56 60
Female (%) 33 25 28
Education
Less than HS degree (%) 31 25 27
High school degree (%) 31 29 30
Some college or AA Degree (%) 28 27 27
College Degree (%) 11 19 16
Lowest ever CD4 count (cells/￿l)
b
>500 (%) 11 2 6
200-499 (%) 46 33 39
50-200 (%) 26 37 33
0-50 (%) 17 27 23
AIDS (%)
c 33 46 41
State instruments
Medically needy threshold (% of FPL) 47 49 49
SSI threshold >65% of FPL (% respondents) 93 91 92
Number of partners in the last 12 months
0-1 partner (%) 73 74 74
2 partners (%) 9 8 8
3 or more partners (%) 19 18 18
Number of new partners in the last 12 months
No partners (%) 68 70 69
1 partner (%) 15 12 13
2 or more partners (%) 17 18 18
Notes:  State instruments were obtained from Westmoreland (1999).  All other variables
come from HCSUS Follow-Up 2.  All data are directly self-reported, except where noted.
aHAART is defined as a combination drug therapy involving three types of drugs:  
nucleoside reverse transcriptase inhibitors, protease inhibitors, and non-nucleoside 
reverse transcriptase inhibitors.  All regimens require at least three drugs, and the vast 
majority inovlve at least one protease inhibitor.  A respondent is classified by the survey
as being on HAART if he/she reported taking any one of the HAART combinations.
bCD4 count, which is self-reported, is used to gauge the health of an HIV+ person.
A higher count indicates better health.
cThe presence of AIDS is based on self-reported CD4 counts, and self-reported 
opportunistic infections.  The HCSUS imputes the presence of AIDS using these data, 
according to CDC algorithms.
9To characterize the health of treated and untreated individuals, we report both the preva-
lence of AIDS,12 and the distribution of lowest-ever CD4 counts. The CD4+ t-lymphocyte
cell count is a critical measure of the function of a patient’s immune system. A depletion in
these cells correlates strongly with the worsening of HIV disease and physical health [Fauci
et al., 1998]. Lowest-ever CD4 count measures severity by gauging the farthest progression
of the disease. Table I splits CD4+ counts into four categories. Patients with CD4+ lympho-
cyte counts below 50 have a very poor prognosis in general; while those with counts above
500 are considered reasonably healthy.
Table I corroborates the ﬁndings of other researchers in showing that, unconditionally,
the treated are no more promiscuous than the untreated. However, it also demonstrates the
diﬃculty of drawing causal inferences from this fact alone. Treated patients suﬀer from more
advanced disease, as they are more likely to have CD4 counts that once dropped below 50,
or below 200, and they are also more likely to have AIDS.
IV Empirical Model
Table I illustrates how simple comparisons of sexual activity by treatment status can be
misleading. As a result, we develop an identiﬁcation strategy that isolates quasi-random
variation in the provision of treatment. The strategy derives its power from HAART’s
high cost and from its extraordinary eﬀectiveness. In 1998, the average HAART regimen
cost Medicaid about $13,000, but HAART cuts mortality (in clinical trials) by about 50%.
Since only one-quarter of the HIV+ have private insurance,13 obtaining health insurance
through Medicaid can mean the diﬀerence between receiving or not receiving HAART, and
in turn the diﬀerence between good health and rapid physical deterioration. This suggests
12The occurrence of AIDS is derived from the individual’s self-reported CD4 counts, and the self-reported
occurrence of opportunistic infections. The HCSUS imputes the presence of AIDS according to these data,
using CDC algorithms.
13In HCSUS Follow-up 2, 25% have private insurance, 17% are uninsured, and 58% have public insurance.
51% of respondents have some Medicaid coverage.
10the possibility of using Medicaid eligibility rules as instruments for HAART receipt that are
arguably unrelated to other determinants of sexual activity.
Previous research has already documented the strong eﬀect of public insurance on the
receipt of HAART and correspondingly on health and survival. Bhattacharya et al. [2003]
use Medicaid eligibility rules (the same ones proposed as instruments here) to instrument
for public insurance, as 90% of the publicly insured HIV+ have Medicaid coverage. They
ﬁnd that Medicaid eligibility rules are extremely strong predictors of public insurance (Wald
Test = 38) with the medically needy threshold having the highest predictive power. Their
results show that the receipt of public insurance reduces 1-year mortality rates by 66% [also
cf, Goldman et al., 2001]. They also ﬁnd that controlling for receipt of HAART virtually
wipes out the mortality gradient across the publicly insured and uninsured. These results
suggest that access to HAART may explain a substantial proportion of the mortality beneﬁts
of public insurance for the HIV+, if not all of it.
A Treatment Eﬀects Model of HAART and Sexual Behavior
The ﬁrst step in developing our identiﬁcation strategy is to build a model that allows for the
joint determination of treatment status and sexual activity. A simple way to do this is to
use a standard “treatment eﬀects” model with instrumental variables. Speciﬁcally, we use
a two-equation model where the ﬁrst-stage models the binary receipt of HAART treatment
as a probit, and the second-stage is a linear model for the number of sexual partners. As
instruments for the receipt of treatment, we rely on state Medicaid policy variables that, we
argue, aﬀect the availability of treatment, but not sexual activity.
Let T ∗




i = β1Xi + β2Zi − ²T,i (5)
The vector Xi represents observed exogenous covariates that determine treatment propensity:
11age, gender, education, along with state-level social and economic factors. (The full list of
variables appears in Section V.) Zi is our vector of state Medicaid eligibility instruments.
Treatment is also assumed to depend on a random error component ²T,i that is uncorrelated
with Xi and Zi. Deﬁne Ti as the indicator variable for whether individual i actually received
HAART; it equals unity if and only if the latent index T ∗
i exceeds zero.
Let Si represent the number of sex partners for HIV+ patient i:
Si = ζ1Ti + ζ2Xi − ²S,i (6)
For simplicity, we assume Si depends linearly on Xi. To complete the model and allow for
correlation between treatment and sexual activity, we assume the errors ²S,i and ²T,i are
jointly distributed as bivariate normal with correlation coeﬃcient ρ. It is useful to think of
this correlation ρ as unobserved health. That is, patients with poor unobserved health are
more likely to get treatment and they are also less likely to be sexually active. We estimate
this joint model via maximum likelihood.14
B A Count Data Model of Sex Partners
While the simple treatment eﬀects approach is standard, its limitation is the modeling of sex
partners as a continuously distributed variable, instead of an integer-valued count. Therefore,
we present an alternative “count data” approach where the number of partners follows a
negative binomial distribution, but HAART receipt continues to be modeled simply as a
probit [see Deb and Trivedi, 2004, for a detailed exposition of the model].
Suppose there is some common unobserved component in the treatment and sex partner
equation. Concretely, one can think of this as health status. This component, η, is assumed
to be distributed as a standard normal random variable, so that the latent treatment equation
14Maddala [1986] derives the maximum likelihood estimator. Computationally, we use the standard





i = δ0 + δ1Xi + δ2Zi − νT,i − ηi (7)
We assume that νT,i and ηi are distributed standard normal, and that Ti continues to follow
the latent index T ∗
i . Therefore, conditional on η, Ti follows a probit as before. Eﬀectively,
unobserved heterogeneity in the treatment equation is decomposed into one component that
is not correlated with sexual behavior (νT,i) and another one that is (ηi).
The number of sex partners is distributed as a Poisson process with mean/variance pa-
rameter exp(θ0 + θ1Xi +θ2Ti − ληi − νS,i). Just as in the treatment equation, heterogeneity
in the number of sex partners is decomposed into a component that is uncorrelated with
treatment, νS,i, and one that is, ηi. Notice that λ is the covariance between the correlated
errors in the two equations. If νS,i is assumed to follow a Γ(α) distribution, Si is distributed
as a negative binomial with mean µ ≡ exp(θ0 + θ1Xi + θ2Ti − ληi − νS,i). We estimate the
parameters of this model via Maximum Likelihood; details of the likelihood function are
given in Appendix IV.
C Identiﬁcation
We use state Medicaid policies as the instrumental variables Zi assumed to aﬀect treatment
status but not sexual activity directly. Medicaid is the most common form of insurance
for the HIV+ population in care, covering 51% of the HIV+ and 61% of the insured HIV+.
HIV+ patients can qualify for Medicaid through at least two pathways.15 First, Supplemental
Security Income (SSI) beneﬁciaries are automatically eligible for Medicaid in 38 states. The
other states have diﬀerent standards for eligibility either as a 209(b) state or a waiver state.
Section 209(b) of the Social Security Amendments Act of 1972 allows States to include more
restrictive deﬁnitions of “disability” and lower income and assets standards for Medicaid
15The third pathway is Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC): patients who meet the state’s
income eligibility and family composition requirements for AFDC as they existed on July 16, 1996 qualify
for Medicaid coverage. We do not use AFDC eligibility as an instrument, since this aﬀects incentives for
family formation and possibly sexual activity as well.
13eligibility. Second, Medicaid eligibility is also available through a “medically needy” program
for individuals who meet Medicaid’s disability criteria but have incomes that exceed the
ﬁnancial eligibility limit. The program allows individuals to “spend-down” to Medicaid
eligibility by deducting medical-related expenses from their reported income. States have
the option but are not required to establish a medically needy program. In addition, states
vary in their income eligibility levels for the medically needy program.
As our instruments, we use the following two variables:
• “Medically Needy Threshold” is the state’s income eligibility threshold for the medi-
cally needy program expressed as a percentage of the federal poverty line.16
• “SSI > 65% FPL” is an indicator variable for whether the state’s income eligibility
threshold for Medicaid eligibility through the “SSI” category was less than 10 per-
centage points lower than the federal guideline of 75 percent of the federal poverty
line.17
Our state policy instruments could fail if they are correlated with unobserved state-
level determinants of sexual activity.18 To address this issue, we develop evidence that our
instruments are related to state-speciﬁc diﬀerences in sexual activity only through their
eﬀects on HIV treatment receipt, and not otherwise.
Valid instruments would aﬀect sexual activity only through their impact on HAART.
Before the advent of HAART around 1996, there should have been no relationship between
16States which did not institute a medically needy program were coded as having an income threshold of
zero percent. Specifying the state’s medically needy threshold as a continuous variable was a better predictor
of treatment (in the sense of a higher partial chi-squared statistic) than a dummy variable for whether states
have a medically-needy program or various alternative nonlinear speciﬁcations. The main results for the
eﬀect of HAART on sexual activity are highly robust across these diﬀerent speciﬁcations.
17We coded the SSI threshold as a dummy variable, because there were only four states that implemented
a signiﬁcantly more restrictive eligibility standard than the federal guideline of 75% of the federal poverty
line.
18If respondents with more severe disease moved to states with more generous Medicaid policies our
instruments would be correlated with unobserved severity of disease. However, less than 3% of the HCSUS
sample migrated across states between Baseline and the Second Follow-Up interviews, despite dramatic
improvement in HIV treatment during this period.
14Medicaid eligibility policies and sexual activity. A nonzero pre-HAART relationship would
suggest the presence of unobserved state-speciﬁc determinants of sexual activity, correlated
with Medicaid policies. After HAART, generous Medicaid rules would increase the survival of
HIV+ patients; according to theory, this would promote precaution among the uninfected.19
If the instruments are valid, a negative relationship between Medicaid generosity and sexual
activity may emerge after HAART, but none should be present before HAART.
Motivated by these observations, we examine the relationship between 1996 state Med-
icaid rules and sexual activity among the uninfected, both before and after the advent of
HAART. It is particularly useful to investigate uninfected populations with similar risk char-
acteristics to the HIV+. We do this using high HIV risk subsamples from the General Social
Surveys (GSS).
The GSS collect data from a nationally representative sample of individuals on social
attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors, including sexual behavior. These include questions about
lifetime sexual history: number of partners since age 18, by gender; and ever having paid for
or having been paid for sex. Respondents are also asked more speciﬁc questions about their
sexual experiences during the last twelve months: the number and gender of sex partners;
and the type of sex partner, e.g., prostitute, acquaintance, neighbor, friend, stranger, spouse,
long-term lover, and so forth. From these questions, we measure the recent and long-term
riskiness of each respondent’s behavior.
For the pre-HAART period, we use all GSS survey years from 1988 to 1994;20 these
include 1988-1991 annually, 1992, and 1994. For the post-HAART period, we use all years
from 1998 to the present; these include 1998, 2000, and 2002. These choices end up providing
about as much power in the pre-HAART period as post-HAART, a desirable property since
we are testing for a zero eﬀect pre-HAART and nonzero post-HAART.
19There may be an oﬀsetting positive relationship if uninfected people in more generous states face a lower
cost of disease, but this presumes uninfected people heavily discount the possibility of cross-state migration
before or at the future date of infection.
20The sexual behavior questions were redesigned beginning in 1988.
15We construct high-risk samples from the GSS in three ways. Our simplest approach is
to isolate males who report ever having had sex with someone previously unknown to them,
i.e., respondents who report: (1) Sex with a prostitute in the last 12 months; or (2) Sex with
a casual date or “pick-up” in the last 12 months; or (3) Ever having paid for or ever having
been paid for sex.21 We pick males here, because the HIV+ population is three-quarters
male. We call this the “Risky Males” sample.
While the simplicity of the above approach is attractive, there are diﬀerences in observ-
able characteristics (race, age, gender, and sexual orientation) between risky males and the
HIV+. To complement it, therefore, we re-weight the sample of all risky (male and female)
respondents to match the age, gender, race, and sexual orientation composition of the HIV+
population.22 Speciﬁcally, we re-weight the sample so that it matches HCSUS proportions
in terms of: age category (18-29, 30-39, 40-49, and 50+), race (white and non-white), gen-
der, and sexual orientation (straight male or non-straight male).23 Henceforth, this is the
“Weighted Risky” sample.
Finally, we also re-weight the entire universe of adult GSS respondents, according to the
characteristics above. We call this the “Weighted Adults” sample. This provides us with a
larger, more powerful sample that still matches the HCSUS on key observables.
Summary statistics for the three GSS subsamples are shown in Table II. By construction,
the age, race, and gender composition of the re-weighted samples is the same as the HIV+
population in HCSUS Follow-Up 2. Risky males are older and more likely to be white. All
groups are somewhat more educated than the HIV+.24
Comparing this table to the characteristics of the HIV+ population in Table I suggests
that the sexual activity of the HIV+ is likely to be similar. Direct comparison is diﬃcult,
21The latter question is asked from 1991 onwards.
22Unfortunately, more detailed weighting is not possible (e.g., adding education groups), because empty
cells emerge in the GSS among young, gay black males.
23Since very few (less than 2%) HIV+ females report being gay or bi-sexual, we do not explicitly consider
the proportion of non-straight females.
24This has ambiguous and likely small impacts on the sexual risk-taking of these groups, as education has
ambiguous and nonmonotonic eﬀects on the number of sexual partners reported in the GSS.
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Age (years) 39 43 39
Non-white (%) 60 19 60
Female (%) 28 0 28
Years of Schooling
Less than 12th Grade (%) 19 16 18
12th Grade (%) 17 29 33
1-3 years of College (%) 38 28 31
4+ years of College (%) 26 27 25
Number of Partners in Last 12 months
0-1 partner (%) 35 50 74
2 partners (%) 26 14 11
3 or more partners (%) 39 36 15
Notes:  Sample is GSS years 1988-91 annually, 1992, 1994, 1998, 2000, and 2002.
a"Weighted Risky" sample consists of risky males and females (with "risky"defined as in
note b) reweighted to match HCSUS Follow-Up 2 composition in terms of age (18-29, 30-39,
40-49, and 50+), race (white or non-white), gender, and sexual orientation (straight male or
non-straight male).
bHigh-risk males are GSS (years given above) respondents who reported:  (1) Sex with a 
prostitute in the last 12 months, (2) Sex with a casual date or "pick-up" in the last 12
months, or (3) Ever having paid or ever having been paid for sex.
cHIV-weighted sample is the entire GSS sample reweighted to match HCSUS Follow-up
2 composition in terms of age category (18-29, 30-39, 40-49, and 50+), race (white or
non-white), gender, and male sexual orientation (straight male or non-straight male).
17because the HCSUS asks respondents to report partners over the last 6 months, while the
GSS asks about the last year. However, mean partners among the HIV+ seem comparable,
particularly to the weighted risky sample. When we consistently topcode the number of
partners at 5 in both data sets, mean partners are 1.36 in 6 months for HCSUS, and 2.46
in 12 months for the weighted risky GSS sample.25 We can overstate the true 12-month
partners mean for the HIV+ by doubling the 6-month mean, to obtain 2.72. This is an
overstatement, because it topcodes the variable at 10 rather than 5, and because some
people will remain monogamous or not acquire additional partners in the extra 6 months.
In spite of these factors, it is within 10% of the mean for the weighted risky sample. As
discussed in Appendix I, the distribution of partners for the HIV+ likely lies somewhere
between our three subsamples.
Table III presents the eﬀect of Medicaid eligibility rules on the sexual activity of high-risk
uninfected groups, pre- and post-HAART. For each sample and subperiod, we run an OLS
regression and a negative binomial regression26 of sexual activity on: 1996 Medically Needy
Thresholds; whether the 1996 SSI threshold was above or below 65% of the poverty line;
year dummies; gender; black; annual income decile; age category (18-24, 25-29, 30-34, 35-39,
40-44, 45-54, 55-64, 65+); and years of schooling group (less than 12th grade, 12th grade,
1-3 years of college, or 4+ years of college). The number of partners is topcoded at 5 (less
than 2% of the sample is topcoded). Due to the three subsamples, two subperiods, and two
models, the table reports the results of 12 diﬀerent models. To conserve space, we report
only the coeﬃcients on the state policy variables. All standard errors are clustered by state.
Without exception, there is no statistically signiﬁcant relationship between 1996 state
policies and sexual activity pre-HAART. The majority of the point estimates lie at or below
their standard errors. Post-HAART, on the other hand, more generous medically needy
thresholds are always associated with less sexual activity in these high-risk groups. The
25The means are 2.14 for unweighted risky males, and 1.42 for the full re-weighted GSS sample.
26The negative binomial coeﬃcients can be interpreted as percent changes in the number of partners.
18Table III









OLS on Number of Partners
f
Med. Needy Thresh. -0.0033 -0.0135*** -0.0022 -0.0042** -0.0012 -0.0065***
(0.0046) (0.0035) (0.0023) (0.0018) (0.0016) (0.0023)
SSI Thresh. >65% FPL -0.3564 -0.2521 -0.0204 -0.0473 0.0688 -0.1632
(0.3002) (0.2428) (0.0908) (0.1247) (0.2020) (0.1954)
R-Squared 0.37 0.29 0.40 0.29 0.12 0.14
Negative Binomial on Number of Partners
f
Med. Needy Thresh. -0.0010 -0.0058*** -0.0011 -0.0020** -0.0009 -0.0043***
(0.0019) (0.0013) (0.0010) (0.0008) (0.0011) (0.0014)
SSI Thresh. >65% FPL -0.1550 -0.1124 -0.0104 -0.0279 0.0490 -0.1056
(0.1219) (0.0933) (0.0379) (0.0570) (0.1519) (0.1149)
Sample Sizes 506 640 497 559 6338 5479
Robust standard errors, clustered by state, appear in parentheses, underneath coefficients.
*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%
Notes:  All models include dummies for survey year, gender, black, (annual) income decile, 
age (18-24, 25-29, 30-34, 35-39, 40-44, 45-54, 55-64, 65+), and years of schooling group
(less than 12, exactly 12, 13-16, and 16+).
a"Weighted Risky" sample consists of risky males and females (with "risky"defined as in
note b) reweighted to match HCSUS Follow-Up 2 composition in terms of age (18-29, 30-39,
40-49, and 50+), race (white or non-white), gender, and sexual orientation (straight male or
non-straight male).
b"Risky Males" are defined as GSS males who reported:  (1) Sex with a prostitute in the
last 12 months, (2) Sex with a casual date or "pick-up" in the last 12 months, or
(3) Ever having paid for or having been paid for sex (available from 1991 onwards).
c"HIV-weighted adults" sample reweights GSS so that it matches the composition of the
HIV+ population in terms of:  age categories (18-29, 30-39, 40-49, 50+), race (white and 
non-white), and gender risk group (gay male, straight male, or female).  HIV+ population 
proportions are estimated from the HCSUS Follow-Up 2 sample.
dDefined as GSS survey years 1988, 1989, 1990, and 1991.
eDefined as GSS survey years 1998, 2000, and 2002.
fNumber of partners in the past 12 months, which we topcode at 5.  Above this level (1.92% 





19insigniﬁcant coeﬃcients on the SSI variable are consistent with our later ﬁnding that the
medically needy threshold is by far the more individually powerful predictor of HAART
receipt.27
Moreover, with the one exception of the risky males subsample, the signiﬁcant post-
HAART eﬀects survive (at the 1% level) the full battery of region dummies and state-
speciﬁc controls we use in our later HCSUS analysis.28 The pre- and post-HAART eﬀects
of the medically needy threshold are statistically diﬀerent (at 5%) across the board for the
weighted adults sample, and statistically diﬀerent across the board (at 10%) for the weighted
risky sample. We cannot statistically reject equality across periods for the smaller risky male
subsample.
While one can in principle always ﬁnd a statistically insigniﬁcant relationship in a small
enough sample, it is important to note that post-HAART samples of comparable size and
power29 consistently yield signiﬁcant relationships between the medically needy threshold
and the number of sex partners among high-risk subpopulations. This is true regardless
of the model or sample used, and these relationships are fairly robust to a range of state-
and region-level controls. If a correlation between policies and unobserved state-level sexual
preferences existed, it would likely appear in both the pre- and post-HAART periods, but
a causal eﬀect appears only post-HAART. Therefore, our ﬁndings are consistent with the
contention that state Medicaid policies have causal eﬀects rather than correlations with
unobserved determinants of sexual activity. Moreover, even a less generous interpretation of
our results provides some support. If the post-HAART relationship is somehow an artifact
27However, adding the SSI threshold as an instrument signiﬁcantly increases the joint explanatory power
of the two instruments together.
28These include region dummies (Northeast, Midwest, South, and West), state per capita income, state-
level frequency of church attendance, state level attitudes about whether homosexuality is wrong, percent
living in urban areas, and abortion rates. Details regarding these variables can be found in Section V and
Appendix II.
29In all 6 speciﬁcations, the pre-HAART data would have had enough power to identify the estimated post-
HAART eﬀect: Of the 6 post-HAART coeﬃcients on the Medically Needy Threshold, 5 would be signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero at 95% using the standard error in the corresponding pre-HAART model, and the last
would pass a 90% test. Conversely, in all 6 speciﬁcations, the post-HAART data would have failed to reject
equality with zero (at 10%) for a coeﬃcient of the size estimated in the corresponding pre-HAART data.
20of unobserved state-level heterogeneity, it biases us against ﬁnding an eﬀect of HAART on
sexual activity, since more generous states exhibit less sexual activity.
As a ﬁnal check on the plausibility of our results, we compared our estimates for risky
groups to estimates for the population at-large, where one would expect much smaller post-
HAART eﬀects. We do in fact ﬁnd little to no post-HAART eﬀect in the sample of all adult
males (as opposed to high-risk males). OLS regressions for all adult males produces a pre-
period coeﬃcient on the medically needy threshold of -0.0004 with a standard error of 0.0005,
and a post-period coeﬃcient of -0.0013 with a standard error of 0.0010. The coeﬃcients on
the SSI threshold were likewise insigniﬁcant in the pre- and post-periods (sample sizes are
3096 and 2554, respectively).
V Results
A HAART and the Number of Partners
Table IV reports the results from the treatment eﬀects model where HAART receipt is
modeled as a probit and number of partners is modeled linearly. In this table and throughout
the balance of this section, we investigate the impact of HAART treatment on the sexual
activity of the HIV+. To illustrate the consequences of selection bias, we ﬁrst estimate a
na¨ ıve model (left-hand column) where we do not include our state policy instruments and
treat HAART as an exogenous variable. We then estimate instrumental variables models
with progressively larger numbers of controls for state-speciﬁc heterogeneity.
Comparing the na¨ ıve model to our core instrumental variables speciﬁcation (IV Model
1) again suggests that unobserved health generates a spurious negative correlation between
HAART treatment and sexual activity. The na¨ ıve model associates HAART with a statis-
tically signiﬁcant reduction in sexual activity. Instrumenting for HAART, however, reveals
a statistically signiﬁcant increase in sexual activity for the treated population. A treated
21Table IV
Eﬀect of HAART on the number of sex partners for the HIV+, estimated from joint
treatment eﬀects model.
Partners HAART Partners HAART Partners HAART Partners HAART
Age -0.080*** -0.003 -0.076*** -0.002 -0.078*** -0.001 -0.076*** -0.002
[0.016] [0.006] [0.009] [0.005] [0.011] [0.006] [0.011] [0.006]
Non-white -0.543** -0.229** 0.117 -0.228* -0.056 -0.175 -0.075 -0.167
[0.227] [0.107] [0.278] [0.124] [0.212] [0.111] [0.212] [0.110]
Female -1.743*** -0.164** -1.064*** -0.140** -0.980*** -0.151** -0.946*** -0.168**
[0.429] [0.072] [0.180] [0.065] [0.204] [0.070] [0.208] [0.069]
Less than HS degree -2.548*** -0.310** -1.509*** -0.319** -1.364*** -0.353** -1.200*** -0.392***
[0.527] [0.132] [0.432] [0.145] [0.421] [0.145] [0.413] [0.145]
High school degree -2.825*** -0.262** -1.866*** -0.262** -1.803*** -0.268** -1.719*** -0.291***
[0.579] [0.107] [0.500] [0.117] [0.504] [0.108] [0.511] [0.109]
Some college or AA degree   -1.965*** -0.228** -1.010*** -0.271** -0.989*** -0.283*** -0.924*** -0.303***
[0.341] [0.098] [0.291] [0.107] [0.294] [0.104] [0.288] [0.104]
HAART -5.290*** 4.384*** 4.237*** 4.184***
[0.624] [0.962] [0.998] [1.038]
Instruments
a
Medically needy threshold 0.003** 0.004 0.002
[0.001] [0.003] [0.003]
SSI threshold >65% of FPL 0.082 0.274 0.197
[0.076] [0.176] [0.179]
Chi-2 Test for Joint Significance of Instruments 11.91 5.79 1.75






Observations 1396 1396 1396 1396 1396 1396 1396 1396
Robust standard errors clustered by state appear in brackets underneath coefficients.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
  All models were estimated using "treatreg" (with weights and state clusters) in STATA version 8.2.
a State instruments were obtained from Westmoreland (1999)
b Correlation coefficient between error terms:  a negative sign means someone with a positive shock to treatment
probability has a negative shock to his number of partners.
c State controls include state per capita income in 1998, percent living in urban areas, abortion rate, proportion of
GSS respondents (1988-2002) in state who think sexual relations between persons of the same sex are always wrong
or almost always wrong, proportion of GSS respondents (1988-2002) in state who pray several times a week.  Data
on state per capita income in 1998 are based on data from Bureau of Economic Analysis available online at
http://www.bea.gov/bea/regional/spi/. Urbanization data are based on the 2000 Census as reported in the Statistical
Abstract of the United States:  2004-05.  Data on abortion rates (abortions per 1000 females aged 15-44) in 1999 are
based on the survey by The Alan Guttmacher Institute (Finer and Henshaw, 2003), and population estimates from the 
US Census Bureau. We thank Ted Joyce for the abortion rates data.
NO
0.14*** -0.13*** -0.13*** -0.13***




22individual has 4.4 additional partners, which corresponds to a more than 100% increase. The
instrumented model provides further evidence of the role played by unobserved health, since
it estimates a signiﬁcantly negative correlation (rho = −0.13) between unexplained treat-
ment and unexplained sex partners. There is some unobserved factor (e.g., poor health) that
raises the probability of treatment but reduces the number of sex partners.
Jointly, the instruments produce a Chi-2 statistic near 12 (p = 0.003). The medically
needy threshold is the more powerful instrument,30 but the addition of the SSI threshold
improves joint signiﬁcance. Not surprisingly, the ﬁrst-stage power of the instruments declines
as we add more state-level controls: IV Model 2 adds 5 additional state-level variables,
and IV Model 3 adds 3 more. At the end of this subsection, we present a more detailed
discussion of ﬁrst-stage power and show that we have enough power in all speciﬁcations to
make meaningful statistical inferences.
IV Models 2 and 3 check the robustness of our results to the inclusion, in both the
ﬁrst- and second-stage equations, of state controls and region dummies. In IV model 2,
we add: 1998 state per capita income, from Bureau of Economic Analysis Data; the 1999
state-speciﬁc abortion rate, from a survey by the Alan Guttmacher Institute;31 the percent
of the state population living in urban areas, based on the 2000 Census and as reported in
The Statistical Abstract of the United States: 2004-05; and measures of state-speciﬁc church
attendance and tolerance of homosexual activity, both of which are estimated from 1988-2002
GSS respondents. Further details regarding variable construction are found in Appendix III.
The results from IV Model 2, with state controls, are extremely similar to the results from
IV Model 1. The coeﬃcient on HAART falls to 4.24 from 4.38; this decline represents less
than one-sixth of a standard deviation.
In IV Model 3, we add region dummies to all the state-level controls mentioned above. If
our instruments are merely picking up regional diﬀerences in sexual activity (e.g., the South
30This is likely to be because only four states had SSI thresholds below the federal maximum of 75% of
the poverty line.
31We thank Ted Joyce for providing us with the abortion data.
23versus the West), the estimated eﬀect of HAART ought to be signiﬁcantly aﬀected by this
inclusion. It is encouraging that the estimated HAART eﬀects are robust to this inclusion,
and are quantitatively similar to the results of the earlier models. The eﬀect of HAART
remains highly signiﬁcant with all these additional controls.32
As discussed earlier, an alternative approach that accounts for the integer-valued nature of
the sex partner distribution is negative binomial regression. Table V displays the coeﬃcients
and standard errors estimated from the negative binomial sexual partner equation, estimated
jointly with a probit for HAART receipt. The ﬁrst column shows the na¨ ıve model estimated
without instruments. As before, HAART is na¨ ıvely associated with a signiﬁcant reduction
in the number of partners. Instrumenting for HAART once again ﬂips the sign of this eﬀect.
Since negative binomial coeﬃcients have the natural interpretation of percentage changes,
IV Model 1 implies that HAART increases the number of partners by 134%. This is similar
(though slightly larger) in magnitude to the treatment eﬀects estimates, since the mean
number of partners is approximately 3.8. The estimated eﬀect is robust to the inclusion of
region dummies and state controls in IV Model 2, where the estimated eﬀect is 133%.
We now turn to the instruments’ strength. In our core treatment eﬀects model (IV
Model 1), the ﬁrst-stage Chi-2 statistic exceeds the Staiger and Stock “rule of thumb” for
strong instruments, namely a test statistic of 10.0 or higher. However, the core negative
binomial model shows a Chi-2 statistic of 7.62, somewhat below the recommendation of
10. In spite of this, a review of the literature on weak instruments, along with two Monte
Carlo experiments of our own, suggests that our instruments are strong enough to deliver
valid statistical inferences, not just in the core models, but even in the most expansive
speciﬁcations with all 5 state-level controls and 3 region dummies.
Staiger and Stock [1997] observe that weak instruments create two problems: they bias
32Separately, we also studied the impact of HAART on reported safe sex practices. We found that HAART
provision (instrumented by Medicaid eligibility rules) had no signiﬁcant eﬀect on the frequency with which
individuals practiced safe sex. This implies that treatment increases the number of partners but does not
induce more safe sex practices that might oﬀset some of the resulting increase in the risk of transmission.
24Table V
Eﬀect of HAART on the number of sex partners for the HIV+, estimated from joint
negative binomial count data model.
Partners HAART Partners HAART Partners HAART
Age -0.048*** -0.002 -0.048*** -0.002 -0.048*** -0.002
[0.007] [0.007] [0.005] [0.007] [0.005] [0.007]
Non-white -0.160** -0.290* 0.055 -0.292* -0.031 -0.199
[0.068] [0.157] [0.089] [0.163] [0.074] [0.147]
Female -0.764*** -0.239** -0.587*** -0.214** -0.498*** -0.262***
[0.167] [0.099] [0.136] [0.084] [0.130] [0.095]
Less than HS degree -0.998*** -0.400** -0.710*** -0.430** -0.596*** -0.522**
[0.202] [0.196] [0.130] [0.211] [0.141] [0.206]
High school degree -0.960*** -0.360** -0.652*** -0.383** -0.618*** -0.403***
[0.180] [0.151] [0.189] [0.159] [0.170] [0.146]
Some college or AA degree   -0.693*** -0.322** -0.384*** -0.404** -0.393*** -0.423***
[0.112] [0.148] [0.094] [0.147] [0.101] [0.146]




Medically needy threshold 0.004** 0.003
[0.002] [0.005]
SSI threshold >65% of FPL 0.066 0.356
[0.144] [0.290]
Chi-2 Test for Joint Significance of Instruments 7.62 1.67






Observations 1396 1396 1396 1396 1396 1396
Robust standard errors clustered by state appear in brackets underneath coefficients.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Notes: Except where noted, all data are from HCSUS follow-up 2 sample. Number of partners is top-coded at 24 (1.9%
of the sample).  All estimates were obtained using ml maximize (with weights and state clusters) in Stata 9.0.
a State instruments were obtained from Westmoreland (1999)
b Loading factor on common unobserved heterogenity. The negative sign of this coefficient implies errors 
of Partner and HAART equations are negatively correlated
c State controls include state per capita income in 1998, percent living in urban areas, abortion rate, proportion of
GSS respondents (1988-2002) in state who think sexual relations between persons of the same sex are always wrong
or almost always wrong, proportion of GSS respondents (1988-2002) in state who pray several times a week.  Data
on state per capita income in 1998 are based on data from Bureau of economic Analysis available online at
http://www.bea.gov/bea/regional/spi/. Urbanization data are based on the 2000 Census as reported in the Statistical
Abstract of the United States:  2004-05.  Data on abortion rates (abortions per 1000 females aged 15-44) in 1999 are
based on the survey by The Alan Guttmacher Institute (Finer and Henshaw, 2003), and population estimates from 
the US Census Bureau. We thank Ted Joyce for the abortion rates data.







25IV estimates towards the na¨ ıve estimates, and cause estimated conﬁdence intervals to be too
narrow. The ﬁrst issue seems minor in our context, since instrumenting for HAART dramat-
ically ﬂips the sign of the eﬀect,33 but the second issue—known as “test size distortion”—
warrants closer consideration. The “size” of a test is the proportion of times a true null
hypothesis is rejected; e.g., an ideally sized 95% test has size 5%.
In their Monte Carlo analysis, Staiger and Stock compute test size distortions for IV
estimators as a function of the number of instruments, the correlation between error terms
across the ﬁrst- and second-stage equations, and the explanatory power of the instruments.
For a correlation between errors of |0.2| (ours is |0.13|), they ﬁnd maximum likelihood esti-
mates with one or two instruments produce very little test size distortion: 95% Wald tests
are rejected roughly 10% of the time or less.
To investigate the applicability of their results to our estimation context, and to quantify
the impact on our estimated standard errors, we performed our own Monte Carlo experiments
patterned after theirs. The adjustment to our standard errors is based on a key idea in Stock
and Yogo [2002]. They propose deﬁning instruments as “weak” if the test size distortion
exceeds a certain cut-oﬀ. They suggest the following alternatives: instruments are “weak” if
they reject a true 95% Wald test more than 10%, more than 15%, more than 20%, or more
than 25% of the time. We adopt their most stringent deﬁnition and ask: by how much would
we need to inﬂate our standard errors to ensure that a true 95% Wald test be rejected less
than 10% of the time?
To answer this question, we ran two Monte Carlo experiments, one for the treatment
eﬀects data generating process, and another for the joint negative binomial data generating
process. Details appear in Appendix VI. In both experiments, we introduced one continuous
instrument of varying power (similar to the medically needy threshold), and one binary
instrument with less power (like our SSI threshold). We chose error covariance structures
33This ﬁnding is also consistent with theory: Stock and Yogo [2002] suggest that LIML estimates exhibit
comparatively little bias from weak instruments.
26to match the ones we estimate. Our results were qualitatively similar to those of Staiger
and Stock, in the sense that the MLE estimates produced size distortions well below those
typically seen in 2SLS. For the treatment eﬀects model (which displays more vulnerability to
weak instruments), inﬂating the standard errors by 2.08 yields hypothesis tests of acceptable
size (i.e., a 95% test is rejected no more than 10% of the time) even in the most severe
case of truly uncorrelated instruments. Even after applying this worst-case correction to
our standard errors in Table IV, we are left with second-stage estimates that are signiﬁcant
at 5% across the board, with the one exception of IV Model 3, which is signiﬁcant at 10%
(p=0.06). The negative binomial model is even more robust to weak instruments, requiring
little if any inﬂation of standard errors to achieve acceptably sized tests.
B External Validity Tests
The magnitude of our estimated eﬀects seems consistent with external clinical evidence on
the eﬀects of HAART. We obtained estimates from clinical trials of HAART’s eﬀect on
CD4 cell counts — a proven marker of health status and immune function for the HIV+.
The clinical evidence suggests that HAART increases CD4 cell counts by 220 for the median
patient [Hammer et al., 1997; Gulick et al., 1997].34 We then estimated the likely impact of a
220 point CD4 increase in sex partners. Speciﬁcally, we used our entire HCSUS Follow-Up 2
sample, and regressed number of partners on categorical measures of current (self-reported)
CD4 cell count (the categories were: 0-50, 51-200, 201-500, and 500+). Based on this
regression, we then calculated the increase in partners that would occur if every member of
the HCSUS population had his CD4 count increased by 220. This translates into an increase
of 4.1, or a roughly 110% increase in partners. Since these are quite close to the estimates
of the treatment eﬀects and negative binomial models, respectively, improved health alone
is a plausible mechanism through which HAART could achieve the eﬀects we estimate.
34This is the median change in CD4 after 52 weeks of treatment with HAART. The 25th percentile change
was about 140, and the 75th percentile was just over 230 [Gulick et al., 1997].
27In addition, helping individuals qualifying for Medicaid also seems a plausible mechanism
through which Medicaid rules inﬂuence HAART receipt in our models. Most persons with
HIV/AIDS gain Medicaid coverage as a result of illness-related disability [Westmoreland,
1999]. Therefore, Medicaid policies should have a larger impact on receipt of HAART for the
disabled population. To test this, we re-estimated our ﬁrst-stage probit model for HAART
receipt, but this time allowed the eﬀect of the medically needy threshold to vary with AIDS
diagnosis.35 The results suggest that increasing the medically needy threshold from 0%
to 100% of the Federal Poverty Line increases the probability of receiving HAART by 26
percentage points for those with AIDS, but by only 6 percentage points for those whose
disease has not yet progressed that far. This diﬀerence is statistically signiﬁcant at the 1%
level.
VI Treatment Breakthroughs and Infection Risk
HAART increases the sexual activity and the longevity of HIV+ individuals. Both these
eﬀects will increase the average risk of encountering an HIV+ sex partner. However, HAART
also decreases the concentration of the HIV virus in an infected individual. This lowers
infectivity, or the risk of transmission conditional on sexual contact. In this section, we
present some simple calculations that weigh these various eﬀects.
A Calculating the Impact of Treatment on Risk
The ﬁrst-order impact of HAART on infection risk is the change in risk, holding precaution-
ary behavior constant. To estimate this, we begin with the fact that infection risk is the
probability that one’s partner is HIV+, multiplied by the probability of HIV transmission
conditional on contact with an HIV+ partner. Accounting for the clinical evidence that the
35This model included exactly the same demographic and state controls as IV model 2 in Table IV, which
is our “middling” speciﬁcation.
28risk of transmission diﬀers by treatment status, we can represent infection risk as:
φ ≡ Pr(Infection) = Pr(Untreated HIV+ Partner)Pr(Transmission|Untreated HIV+ Partner)+
Pr(Treated HIV+ Partner)Pr(Transmission|Treated HIV+ Partner)
(8)
Recall from the theory that π is prevalence, r+ is the risky behavior of the HIV+
and r the risky behavior of the uninfected. For the purposes of this discussion, we de-
ﬁne risky behavior as the number of sex partners. Deﬁne τ as the proportion of HIV+
on HAART, r
+
T the number of sex partners for a treated HIV+ person, r
+
U the number of
partners for an untreated HIV+ person, and r the number of partners for an uninfected
person. Given these quantities, the probability of encountering a treated HIV+ partner is:





U+(1−π)r. The denominator represents the average
number of sex partners population-wide, while the numerator is the portion of the average
accounted for by the treated HIV+. Pr(Untreated HIV+ Partner) is computed similarly.
Since prevalence is quite close to zero (2002 prevalence was 3 per 1,000 US adults) and r
is held constant in this ﬁrst-order welfare calculation, HIV treatment will have little impact
on the average number of sex partners in the population. Therefore, the only parameters





T ), and infectivity (Pr(Transmission)) due to treatment. The percentage impact




≈ (1 + gπ)[(1 − τ) + τ ((1 + gr+)(1 − gI))] (9)
gI is the percentage decline in infectivity due to treatment, gr+ is the percentage increase
36To be precise,
Pr(Infection|HAART)








If π is close to zero, the last term approaches unity.
29in the number of sex partners among the HIV+ due to treatment, and gπ is the percentage
increase in HIV prevalence associated with the new treatment (i.e., the increase in prevalence
that occurs simply because treatments reduce mortality among the HIV+). Intuitively, the
eﬀect of HAART is the growth in prevalence plus the growth in new infections per HIV+
person. The latter depends on the growth in HIV+ sexual activity, minus the reduction in
infectivity.
B Estimated Parameters
To estimate the impact of HAART on the infection risk of the uninfected, we need to know:
(1) the proportion of HIV+ individuals treated (τ); (2) HAART’s percentage impact on
sex partners (gr); (3) HAART’s percentage impact on prevalence (gπ); and (4) HAART’s
percentage impact on infectivity (gI).
According to HCSUS Follow-Up 2, about 60% of HIV+ individuals were receiving HAART.
The percentage change in sex partners can be read directly from the negative binomial co-
eﬃcients on HAART, which indicates a 133% increase.
The term gπ reﬂects how much prevalence would rise if HAART were the only thing
that changed. We calculate the introduction of HAART by itself would have increased the
long-run prevalence of HIV by at least 50%. Long-run prevalence is approximately equal to
the incidence of the disease multiplied by the longevity of an HIV+ individual.37 Holding
sexual activity constant, incidence will certainly not fall. Moreover, clinical trials show that
HAART increases the life-span of treated individuals by 50% to as much as 80% [Freedberg
et al., 2001]. Therefore, the decline in mortality on its own increases prevalence by at least
50%.
Our estimate of gI acknowledges the medical evidence that HAART reduces the infectivity
37Annual steady-state HIV prevalence is equal to φ ∗ L, where φ is incidence and L is the expected
longevity in years of the HIV+. Deﬁning the survival rate of HIV+ persons as s, and the overall population
as Pop, the evolution of the HIV+ population is governed by HIVt = sHIVt−1 + φPop. The steady-state
expression comes out of this equation, coupled with a constant mortality hazard.
30of a treated HIV+ individual [Barroso et al., 2000; Gray et al., 2001; Fiore et al., 2003; Porco
et al., 2004]. The clinical reduction in infectivity is tempered by a selection eﬀect, which
can cause HAART to increase mean viral load in the sexually active population: reducing
viral loads among the healthiest sexually inactive patients can move them into the sexually
active population, where they may raise mean viral loads. The question, therefore, is what
the empirical viral load distribution looks like with and without HAART, not just what
HAART does to viral load in a randomized trial.
We estimate gI in two steps. We begin with the empirical viral load distributions of
the sexually active HIV+ people in HCSUS, by HAART status. We combine these with
estimates of infectivity by viral load from Gray et al. [2001] and Quinn et al. [2000] to
arrive at an estimate of average infectivity by HAART status (that is, infectivity weighted
by the empirical viral load distributions by HAART status). The Gray et al. [2001] and
Quinn et al. [2000] papers are based on a study of 415 heterosexual, monogamous, and
discordant (one HIV+ and one HIV- partner) couples in Uganda. The investigators measured
viral load for each HIV+ respondent, tested each initially HIV- respondent regularly for
HIV seroconversion, and calculated the probability of transmission based on observed coital
frequency. The result was a table of infectivity risk by viral load; these are the only such
estimates in the literature. Combining this with the empirical eﬀect of HAART on viral
loads in the HCSUS, we calculate that the sexually active treated population would exhibit
infectivity about 13% lower than the sexually active untreated population.




(1 + 0.5)[(1 − 0.6) + 0.6((1 + 1.33)(1 − 0.13))] = (1.50)(1.62) = 2.42
(10)
This is higher than the actual change in incidence (about 42%), which also includes the
eﬀect of rising precaution in the uninfected population. All else equal, the pure mortality
31reduction led to a 50% increase in risk, sexual activity contributed a 79 % increase, and
reduced transmissivity lowered risk by 8%.
The calculation above uses the lowest estimate of HAART’s impact on mortality and the
Ugandan study that is widely considered to be the best available analysis of HIV infectivity.
However, our qualitative conclusions hold up even when we use the least generous available
estimate of infectivity. Porco et al. [2004] calculate a 60% decline in infectivity by compar-
ing empirical rates of transmission pre- and post-HAART. Using this number leads to an
estimated 44% increase in the risk of infection. Later, we show that this lower number still
suggests a decrease in welfare for uninfected Americans.
VII Normative Implications of Treatment
Breakthroughs
While new and improved treatments vastly raise the welfare of the infected, they can some-
times lower welfare for the uninfected by exposing them to a larger and more sexually active
pool of HIV+ people. Therefore, new treatments can call for increases in government subsi-
dies for HIV prevention.
A Welfare Eﬀects of Treatment Breakthroughs
Permanent breakthroughs in treatment obviously improve the lifetime welfare of the infected.
Less clear, however, is the eﬀect on the private welfare of the uninfected. In the long-run
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This consists of the expected utility an individual derives before falling ill (
u(rss)
1−β(1−φ(rss,πss))),





32Calibrating this expression suggests that treatment breakthroughs are most likely to have














Consider the ﬁrst-order welfare change that occurs when infection risk φ rises. Take β to
be 0.97,38 and pre-HAART survival to be 0.8, based on a constant mortality hazard and an
expected lifetime of 5 years from initial infection [Freedberg et al., 2001]. We calculate pre-
HAART φ to be approximately 0.08%.39 Since a life-year spent with disability is commonly
estimated to be about half as valuable as a healthy life-year, we assume that pre-HAART
w(r+)
u(rss) = 0.5 [Erickson et al., 1995]. For the post-HAART values, we use the maximum clinical
estimate of an 80% increase in longevity from HAART, our most conservative estimate that
ﬁrst-order infection risk φ rose by 44%, and conservatively assume that HIV+ individuals
become perfectly healthy, so that w = u(rss). Even under these conservative assumptions,
calibrating Equation 12 reveals a ﬁrst-order welfare decline for the uninfected.40
B Optimal Public Prevention
Welfare decline for the uninfected can never in itself justify the end of treatment provision,
whether from a Paretian, public health, or pragmatic point of view. The relevant question
is how the government can manage and ameliorate this eﬀect. Prevention subsidies can be
an eﬃcient way to do so.
Prevention subsidies have value because a healthy uninfected person does not consider
the impact of his actions on tomorrow’s rate of infection. In a long-run steady-state, the
38This is based on a real interest rate of 3%, assuming that β is the reciprocal of unity plus the real rate.
39In 1995, the incidence of HIV was about 4.75 per 100,000 people. In that year, about half the US
population was over age 18, and (according to the 2000-02 GSS) approximately 13% of US adults were
unmarried with multiple sex partners in the last year. Assuming conservatively that only such people are at
risk for HIV, the incidence is 5 per 6500 people at risk, or 0.08%.
40This result is less likely to hold in developing countries where prevalence and infection risk are extremely
high, or in extremely high-risk subpopulations. However, for the average sexually active, non-monogamous
American, expected utility is likely to have fallen.




















Cost of becoming HIV +
(13)
The long-run external cost of risk-taking consists of: (1) The number of incident cases that
result from a unit change in risky behavior; (2) The long-run increase in the number of cases
that results from a single incident case, which we call the “incidence multiplier;” and (3) The
cost to an individual of becoming infected. Since the external cost can be interpreted as the
per unit tax on risky behavior, understanding changes in external costs provides insight into
the optimal subsidy for prevention. HIV breakthroughs always raise the ﬁrst component of
the external cost,41 have ambiguous eﬀects on the second, and always lower the third. The
need for and degree of government prevention subsidies thus turn on the relative importance
of these three eﬀects.
A variety of subtle comparisons can be made based on the analysis above, but the broad
outlines are straightforward. Increased prevention is called for when new treatments signif-
icantly raise the prevalence of the disease, relative to the cost of being infected. In some
cases, suﬃcient prevention may be undertaken by the private sector alone. When this fails
to be enough, prevention subsidies may a tool to mitigate the erosion of welfare for the
HIV-negative.
The case for public prevention subsidies is particularly strong in the case of foreign aid
to countries ravaged by HIV. Treatment aid may need to be systematically coupled with
resources for prevention, because a one-time foreign aid gift does not reduce the long-run
cost of infection, but may raise long-run prevalence.
41Formally, φr rises with π. This could be oﬀset if r rises, but this is not the empirical experience of
the US. In addition, if π is extremely large, it is possible that increases in prevalence shrink the pool of
uninfected people to such an extent that there are fewer new cases of HIV for a given increase in risk-taking.
34VIII Conclusions
Treating an incurable infectious disease like HIV involves unique issues for individual behav-
ior and social policy. While improvements in treatment clearly raise the welfare of infected
individuals, societies must cope with the reality that treatment can fuel the further spread of
the disease. We have presented empirical evidence consistent with this argument and have
developed a few of its implications for private behavior and public policy.
HIV treatment appears to increase the number of sex partners of HIV+ individuals by
133%. For HIV- people, this increases infection risk by at least 44%, and possibly more than
doubles it. If this increased infection risk outweighs the reduction in the cost of the disease,
HIV breakthroughs might actually lower the lifetime welfare of the uninfected. A simple
calibration of the theoretical model suggests that it does so.
The government’s best response to treatment breakthroughs may be to increase public
spending on prevention. When treatment involves large negative external costs, it is eﬃ-
cient for the government to respond by boosting prevention incentives, which beneﬁt the
uninfected. An incurable infectious disease like HIV can generate a unique complementarity
between treatment breakthroughs and prevention. Looking to the longer-run, our results
suggest that a cure for HIV would have extraordinary welfare beneﬁts, because it would
break the link between treatment and risky behavior by infected individuals.
Our research also suggests the importance of investigating the impact of treatment break-
throughs on the behavior of the uninfected. Elsewhere, we have found that the introduction
of HAART coincided temporally with an increase in condom usage by unmarried and non-
monogamous people, but no change in condom usage by married or monogamous people
[Lakdawalla and Sood, 2004]. Further work is needed to determine whether HIV break-
throughs were the dominant force in generating this behavior. These results will help further
quantify the long-run welfare impacts of breakthroughs on the uninfected population.
35APPENDIX
I GSS Data
This section describes the construction of the GSS variables used in the paper.
Education is reported by grade attainment and postsecondary years completed. Re-
spondents are asked how many primary and secondary grades they have completed, and
how many years of college they attended. Like in the HCSUS analysis, therefore, we have
information on the attainment of a high school degree. However, we have years of postsec-
ondary schooling, rather than the postsecondary degree attainment data in HCSUS.
Income is reported categorically, and the categories change across survey years. In
our analysis, we consistently use annual income deciles, according to the relevant GSS in-
come categorization for that survey year. For 1988 to 1990, the categories are: under $1K,
$1K-2.999K, $3K-3.999K, $4K-4.999K, $5K-5.999K, $6K-6.999K, $7K-7.999K, $8K-9.999K,
$10K-12.499K, $12.5K-14.999K, $15K-17.499K, $17.5K-19.999K, $20K-22.499K, $22.5K-24.999K,
$25K-29.999K, $30K-34.999K, $35K-39.999K, $40K-49.999K, $50K-59.999K, and $60K+.
The 1991-6 surveys added the categories: $60K-74.999K, and $75K+. In addition to these,
the 1998-2002 surveys added: $75K-89.999K, $90K-109.999K, and $110K+.
Sexual Partners and Risk Categories are based on the following series of questions.
“How many sex partners have you had in the last 12 months?” “Was one of the partners
your husband or wife or regular sexual partner?” “If you had other partners, please indicate
all categories that apply to them: Close personal friend; Neighbor, Co-worker, or long-term
acquaintance; Casual date or pick-up; Person you paid or paid you for sex; Other (Please
Specify).” We use the two italicized partner types as two of our three criteria for risky sex.
The last criterion is obtained from the question, “Thinking about the time since your 18th
birthday, have you ever had sex with a person you paid or who paid you for Sex?” The latter
question is available from 1991 onwards, and is not in the 1988-90 survey years.
36Sexual Orientation (for males) is used in our re-weighting of the GSS. We deﬁne as gay
any man who reports having had a gay sexual encounter since the age of 18 (more stringent
deﬁnitions produced qualitatively similar results). Speciﬁcally, the GSS asks, “Now thinking
about the time since your 18th birthday (including the past 12 months) how many male
partners have you had sex with?”
Distribution of Partners in HCSUS and GSS subsamples. The distribution of
HIV+ partners likely lies somewhere between the risky males sample and the weighted adults.
Consider two scenarios: (1) HCSUS respondents who reported zero or one partners in the
last 6 months remained abstinent or monogamous for the last 12 months, but that other
respondents ended up with twice as many partners over 12 months as they would have in 6
months; or (2) HCSUS respondents who reported abstinence over the last 6 months remained
abstinent or monogamous over 12 months, but all others had twice as many partners over the
12-month period. These alternative approaches produce partner distributions [0-1 partners,
2 partners, and 3+ partners] of [74%,0%,26%] and [34%,40%,26%], respectively. Both these
would be less risky than the distribution for the weighted risky sample, but both are also
more risky than the weighted adults sample.
II HCSUS Data
In this section, we describe the variable deﬁnitions and sample selection for the HCSUS
data. Detailed technical descriptions of the HCSUS sample and weighting procedure appear
in Duan et al. [1999]. Questionnaires and information about the survey are available on the
web at http://www.rand.org/health/projects/hcsus/index.html.
We construct analytic weights to calibrate the sample to the reference population. A
respondent’s analytic weight, which may be interpreted as the number of people in the
population represented by that respondent, is the product of three patient-speciﬁc quantities:
the sampling weight, the multiplicity weight, and the non-response weight. The sampling
37weight adjusts for oversampling (of women, for example); the multiplicity weight adjusts for
patients who could potentially enter the sample via multiple providers; and the non-response
weight adjusts for diﬀerential cooperation [Duan et al., 1999]. All analyses presented in this
paper use these weights.
Number of partners and number of new partners were self-reported. Respondents
were asked “how many diﬀerent people have you had either oral, anal, or vaginal sex in
the last 6 months? Your best estimate is ﬁne.” Respondents who reported at least one sex
partner were asked “Of these people, how many of them were new partners, that is, people
you had oral, anal, or vaginal sex with for the ﬁrst or only time in the last 6 months?”
The indicator for HAART use was constructed by Andersen et al. [2000] and is based
on recommendations published by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. It is
based on detailed self-reports of prescription drug use. Speciﬁcally, HAART was deﬁned as
using a protease inhibitor (PI), a non-nucleoside reverse transcriptase inhibitor (NNRTI), or
a nucleoside reverse transcriptase inhibitor (NRTI) in various combinations. For example,
HAART includes: two or more NRTIs in combination with at least one PI or one NNRTI;
or one NRTI in combination with at least one PI and at least one NNRTI. Combinations
of older drugs such as zidovudine, which is an NRTI, with either a PI or NNRTI, were not
considered HAART.
Education is reported by degree attainment and years completed. Respondents were
asked, “How many years of regular school or college did you ever complete and get credit for?”
Respondents were also asked about highest degree or diploma they have attained. Based on
the responses to these questions we classiﬁed respondents into 4 mutually exclusive education
groups: (1) Less than high school degree – highest degree is “none/less than high school”
and years of schooling is less than or equal to 9 years, (2) High school degree – highest
degree is “high school diploma or G.E.D.” and years of school is less than or equal to 12
years, (3) Some college or AA degree – highest degree is high school diploma, AA degree
38or 2 year college degree and years of schooling is less than or equal to 15 years, (4) College
degree – highest degree is 4-year college degree, or professional/graduate degree and years
of schooling is 16 years or more.
We used 2 measures of health status from the HCSUS – lowest-ever CD4 count and
AIDS. CD4 cells are immune cells and lower cell counts imply worse health. The data on
lowest ever CD4 cell count are self reports based on the the question “Of all your CD4 tests,
what was your lowest count?”. AIDS is based on self reports of a detailed list of clinical
conditions and symptoms. Respondents were coded as having AIDS if they had any of the
“AIDS-deﬁning or indicator conditions” outlined by the CDC deﬁnition of AIDS, or if their
CD4 count was suﬃciently low as to indicate AIDS according to CDC guidelines.
We used a measure of unsafe sex from the HCSUS, based on the question: “When
you have had sex since ﬁnding out you are HIV+, how often have you had unsafe sex? (1)
Always, (2) Usually, (3) About half the time, (4) Sometimes, or (5) Never.” In our analysis,
people who responded about half the time, sometimes, or never were coded as practicing
unsafe sex. This information was combined with information on the number of partners in
the last 6 months to classify respondents into 4 mutually exclusive categories: abstinent,
monogamous, safe sex with multiple partners, or unsafe sex with multiple partners.
III State-Level Characteristics Data
Data on Medicaid policies (Medically Needy threshold and SSI threshold) is from the
Kaiser Family Foundation publication on Medicaid policy related to HIV/AIDS [Westmore-
land, 1999]. Both income eligibility thresholds are expressed as a percentage of the Federal
Poverty Line (FPL).
Data on state per capita income in 1998 is from the Bureau of Economic Analy-
sis, available online at http://www.bea.gov/bea/regional/spi/. Per capita income is total
personal income divided by total midyear population. Data on personal income are from
39national income accounts; population data are from the Bureau of the Census.
Data on abortion rates (abortions per 1000 females aged 15-44 years) in 1999 are based
on an abortion provider survey conducted by The Alan Guttmacher Institute and population
estimates from the Bureau of the Census. Details of the survey design are available in Finer
and Henshaw [2003]. These data were provided by Ted Joyce.
Data on attitudes towards homosexuality are based on author tabulations from all
the 1988-2002 GSS surveys. Respondents were asked: “What about sexual relations between
two adults of the same sex—do you think it is always wrong, almost always wrong, wrong
only sometimes, or not wrong at all?” Pooling all years, for each state we calculated the
proportion of adults that thought homosexual relations are always wrong or almost always
wrong.
Data on religiosity are also based on tabulations from all the 1988-2002 GSS surveys.
Respondents were asked: “About how often do you pray? Several times a day, once a day,
several times a week, once a week, less than once a week, or never?” Pooling all years, for
each state we tabulated the proportion of adults who pray at least several times a week.
Data on urbanization measures percent of the population in a state living in urban
areas. These data are based on the 2000 Census and reported in the Statistical Abstract of
the United States: 2004-05.
IV Negative Binomial Model
Under the negative binomial model we have constructed, the probability that an individual
i will have si sex partners in a given year is:























NB2(si|Zi,λ,δ2,ηi)(1 − Φ(δ1Xi − ηi))φ(ηi)dηi
¸Ti=0 (IV-2)
Since it is not feasible to integrate over η directly, we approximate this by drawing J values
of η from a standard normal distribution. The estimates in the paper are based on analysis
with 1000 draws using Halton sequences. The approximate contribution of patient i to the















NB2(si|Zi,λ,δ2,ηj)(1 − Φ(δ1Xi − ηj))
#Ti=0 (IV-3)
V Steady-State Dynamics
The value function v(π) is convex decreasing, because its associated functional mapping sat-
isﬁes Blackwell’s suﬃcient conditions for a contraction mapping, and because that mapping
takes a convex decreasing function and produces another convex decreasing function: if v is





+ βv(π0) is convex
decreasing in π. Therefore, the ﬁxed point of the mapping must also be convex decreasing.













Assumption V.2. 1 − s − φπ > 0
Assumption V.1 means that the private marginal utility of risk-taking falls when preva-
lence rises. Assumption V.2 implies that higher steady-state prevalence levels must be sup-
41ported by higher levels of risk-taking by the uninfected.
Assumption V.1 is nontrivial, because increased prevalence has oﬀsetting eﬀects on the
marginal utility of risk-taking: it raises the impact of risk-taking on exposure (φrπ > 0), but
it lowers the lifetime utility of a healthy person relative to a sick one. High prevalence could
encourage risk-taking, because staying healthy becomes more costly. This point is empha-
sized by Kremer [1996]. For observed US prevalence levels (lower than developing country
levels), it appears that prevalence discourages risk-taking [Ahituv et al., 1996; Philipson,
2000].
Assumption V.2 is very likely to hold in the pre-HAART equilibrium, and thus is useful
for assessing the eﬀect of HAART. Note that, at any steady-state, it must be true that
1−φπ > 0. Therefore, when survival rates s are low, the assumption condition is also likely
to hold. Comparative dynamics that begin with the post-HAART equilibrium might be
diﬀerent, if rates of healthy survival increase dramatically so as to violate this assumption.
This would lead to unstable equilibria.
Given Assumption V.1, the optimal risk-taking level falls with prevalence (which lowers
the marginal utility of risky behavior), and rises with breakthroughs in treatment s (which
lower the cost of infection, holding prevalence ﬁxed). Given Assumption V.2, the steady-
state risk level rises with steady-state prevalence, but falls with s. When s is higher, infected
people live longer, and it requires less risk-taking to support a given level of prevalence. This
leads to the two curves in Figure II that deﬁne a unique steady-state equilibrium.













This assumption implies that the increase in risky behavior by the HIV+ lowers risk-
taking among the HIV-. Generally, there are two oﬀsetting eﬀects: increases in r+ lower the
relative beneﬁt of remaining healthy, but raise the risk of infection. Just as with prevalence,
we assume that the latter eﬀect dominates the former in developed countries.
42VI Monte Carlo Analyses
To investigate the impact of weak instruments on our ability to make valid statistical infer-
ences, we conducted Monte Carlo analyses modeled on those of Staiger and Stock [1997],
who performed similar experiments for continuously linear models. Following their lead, we
focus purely on the weak instruments problem, and abstract from other potential concerns
like misspeciﬁcation or omitted variables. We performed two sets of experiments: one where
the data-generating process matches the treatment eﬀects model, and one where it matches
the joint negative binomial model.
A Treatment Effects Model
Suppose that the data-generating process is characterized by the following equations:
T
∗
i = β0 +
β1 √
N
Z1 + β2Z2 + ²T (VI-4)
Ti = (T
∗
i > 0) (VI-5)
Si = α0 + α1Ti + ²S (VI-6)




T = 1) (VI-7)
Just as in Staiger and Stock, all parameters are normalized to standard values except for the
between-equation correlation term. The correlation between error terms is picked to match
our empirical estimate of ρ = −0.2.
T ∗
i is the latent treatment index, and Ti is the binary treatment variable. Z1 is the
continuous instrument, modeled as a standard normal. We normalize its coeﬃcient by
√
N
(N is the number of observations) to make our test statistics invariant to sample size; this is
the same approach adopted by Staiger and Stock [1997]. Z2 is a binary variable with mean
430.9 (to match our SSI threshold variable) and generated as:
Z2 = (Z
∗
2 > 0.9) (VI-8)
Z
∗
2 ∼ Uniform[0,1] (VI-9)
For ease of interpretation and testing, we set all the true parameter values to be zero,
except for β1, the power of the continuous instrument, which we allowed to vary. The
uncorrelatedness of the binary instrument Z2 is a conservative approach to our ﬁnding that
the SSI threshold was not individually signiﬁcant in any of our models.
For each replication of the model above, we generated 2000 observations using the above
equations, and (based on these generated observations) calculated the treatment eﬀects esti-
mate of ˆ α1, its associated standard error, and the joint chi-squared statistic associated with
testing the hypothesis that (β1 β2) = ~ 0. To analyze the consequences of weak instruments,
we allowed the coeﬃcient β1 to take on the values 0,1,3,5, where 0 is the worst-case of
uncorrelated instruments.
We replicated the model 5000 times.42 In other words, for each value of c, we had 5000
estimates of ˆ α1, its standard error, and the ﬁrst-stage chi-squared. With this set of estimates,
we calculated the proportion of times the estimator rejected the hypothesis α1 = 0 with 95%
conﬁdence. We call this the “size” of the hypothesis test.
Finally, for each value of β1, we calculate the extent to which we would have to inﬂate
the estimated standard error in order to produce a size of 10% or less, which would meet
Stock and Yogo [2002]’s most stringent deﬁnition of strong instruments.43 We call this the
“standard error inﬂation factor.” These factors are calculated via grid search.
42We ran two sets of 5000 replications each and found virtually identical estimates from each set.
43They propose the following alternative tests of “weak” instruments: an instrument is weak if it rejects
a true 5% Wald test more than 10%, more than 15%, more than 20%, or more than 25% of the time.
44B Negative Binomial Model
We repeated the Monte Carlo exercise above for the joint negative binomial-probit data-
generating process. Here, we assumed that the data were generated according to:
Ti = δ0 + δ1Z1 + δ2Z2 − νT,i − ηi (VI-10)
µ = exp(δ3 − θTi − ληi − νS,i) (VI-11)
Si ∼ Poisson(µ) (VI-12)
νT,i ∼ N(0,1) (VI-13)
ηi ∼ N(0,1) (VI-14)
νS,i ∼ Γ(α) (VI-15)
α = 1,λ = −1.3 (VI-16)
Z1 and Z2 are deﬁned as before, and as before, we set δ2 = 0 to model the weakness of
the binary instrument. The value for λ is chosen to match our empirical estimates of the
correlation structure. We set δ3 = 1, since this generates a mean of 3.8, close to the empirical
mean for partners. For convenience, we set δ0 = θ = 0. We allow the power of the continuous
instrument to vary across δ1 = 0,1,3,5.
For each value of δ1, we ran 1000 replications, at which point our results were quite stable.
For each replication, we estimated the joint negative binomial-probit model via the method
of simulated maximum likelihood.44 This yielded an estimate ˆ θ, a corresponding standard
error, and a ﬁrst-stage chi-squared statistic. Based on these estimates, we computed test
sizes for 95% conﬁdence intervals around ˆ θ, and calculated inﬂation factors for the standard
error of ˆ θ.
44The SMLE estimator was computed using 100 draws.
45C Results
The results of the two Monte Carlo experiments are given in Table VI-1. The “Size” column
reports the actual size of a 95% Wald test that compares the relevant estimate to its mean.
“Size” is deﬁned as the proportion of times the null hypothesis is rejected; therefore, an ideal
estimator has size 5%. The inﬂation factor is the extent to which we would have to inﬂate
the standard error on the second-stage treatment eﬀect estimate, in order to obtain size less
than or equal to 10%.
The Monte Carlo experiments demonstrate that the negative binomial model is not very
sensitive to the weak instruments problem; test sizes are similar to those found by Staiger
and Stock [1997] for LIML estimates of linear models. Sizes are all under 10%; therefore,
even for uncorrelated instruments, the estimator does not meet the Stock and Yogo [2002]
deﬁnition of a weak instrument, which should have size greater than 10%.
The treatment eﬀects model is much more susceptible to the weak instruments problem.
However, even in the worst-case scenario of uncorrelated instruments, inﬂating the second-
stage standard errors by 108% would produce acceptably sized hypothesis tests. Applying
this correction to all our treatment eﬀects estimates would still yield signiﬁcant estimates
across the board. The estimates in IV Models 1 and 2 would be signiﬁcant at 5%, and the
estimate in IV Model 3 has a p-value of 0.06.
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